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Jose Asturias

Why do Individuals Contribute to Public Radio?
Introduction
The benefits of many public goods—traditionally defined as being non-rival and
non-excludable—are available to one and all nominally at no expense. That situation
notwithstanding, millions of dollars are given voluntarily every year by private citizens to
support those very services.
The puzzle has long baffled economists. Why do individuals donate money to
public goods whose benefits they can equally consume without contributing? The facts
do not conform to theories of self-interested utility maximization of individuals. Clearly,
any amount donated by an individual out of his finite income is at the expense of his own
overall consumption. The resulting reduction in consumption implies a decrease in
utility, making giving the less attractive of the two choices.
Yet, paradoxically, charitable donations are huge: nearly $250 billion, or roughly
2% of GDP in 2004 (Giving USA, 2005). Moreover, many institutions, ranging from
public radio to the Red Cross, depend on this source of income for a large part of their
funding. If consumers are not maximizing self-interested utility, then what are they
maximizing? This paper addresses the question through data collected in a public radio
donation drive. As a non-rival and non-excludable public good that citizens actively
fund, the institution of public radio offers a unique opportunity to collect data on the
motivation behind the phenomenon.
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Background
Economists have developed a body of literature over the last decades that attempts
to explain charitable giving. Conscious that narrowly tying utility to consumption has
failed to produce a good answer, these studies include other preferences.
The theory of altruism (Becker, 1974) holds that individuals naturally want to
improve the well-being of others. Becker’s model describes a person’s utility function as
U(x, y) where x measures an individual’s private consumption and y measures the wellbeing of recipients of charity. The person wants to see others in society better off; as a
result, a rational person will donate when the loss in utility from his reduction in private
consumption is smaller than the gain in his utility as a result of others increased
happiness. Much literature has been written challenging this theory. Sugden (1982,
1984) finds properties that contradict empirical findings. The most glaring problem with
this model is the implication that if other donors increase their donations, an individual
will decrease his own donations (see Sugden, 1982, page 346). As described later, a large
body of empirical analysis contradicts this result.
Warm-glow, a alternative theory proposed by Andreoni (1990), asserts that in
addition to interdependent utility functions, the act of giving increases an individual’s
utility. Andreoni’s model describes a person’s utility function as U(x, g, G) where x is
private consumption, g is the gift to the public good, and G = ∑gi is the total size of the
public good. This general form also permits two other cases. The first is when the person
is purely altruistic and does not care about the gift. Hence, his utility will be of a form
U(x, G). The second is when the person is motivated only by the act of giving, or warm
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glow. Hence, the utility will be U(x, g). If the utility function contains x, g, and G then
the person is impurely altruistic.
Andreoni (1995) conducted a laboratory experiment that found that people are
significantly more willing to donate if appeals are framed as positive externalities and not
negative externalities. In other words, individuals are more likely to donate if those who
request donations focus on the positive results of donating rather than the misfortunes
that would occur if individual did not donate. This has implications in favor of the
“warm-glow” model. The motivation at work, Andreoni notes, cannot be pure altruism,
for under that theory individuals would behave in the same way regardless of the appeal’s
positive or negative thrust. He explains, “This indicates that much of the cooperation
observed in public goods experiments is due to framing, and that the warm-glow of
creating a positive externality appears to be stronger than the cold-prickle of creating a
negative externality.”
Implicit in this analysis is the pivotal role of framing in determining how
individuals feel about giving and even about whether they experience warm-glow or not.
The existence of an asymmetry in how people donate depending on the focus of the
advertising shows the importance of framing.

This shows that individuals receive

different amounts of enjoyment from donating under different circumstances, with some
sort of warm-glow phenomenon evidently at work.
Other theories concentrate on pro-social behavior focus and conditional
cooperation—the notion that individuals are more likely to contribute when others
contribute.

Multiple empirical studies confirm that conditional cooperation strongly

influences donations. List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) found that increasing seed money
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significantly boosted participation rates and average gift size.

More specifically,

increasing seed money from 10 percent to 67 percent of the campaign goal produced a
nearly six-fold increase in contributions, with significant effects of both participation
rates and average gift size.
Frey and Meier (2004) conducted a field experiment at the University of Zurich
during an annual fundraiser to benefit student financial aid programs. Some students were
presented with information that a relatively high percentage of the student population (64
percent) contributed whereas another group was given information that a relatively low
percentage had donated (46 percent). Using a conditional logit model to analyze the
results, the researchers estimated that a change in expectations from 46 percent to 64
percent increases the probability of contributing for an individual by around 11.5
percentage points.
Shang and Croson (2004a), (2004b), (2005c) and Shang, Croson and Reed (2005)
confirmed these findings in the context of public radio.

In these series of field

experiments, operators at a public radio station described donation sizes of prior callers.
There was also a control group in which the operator did not mention any amount. The
studies found that if the amount indicated by the operator was $300 (94 percentile) then
contributions by new members increased by about $52 or 43% as compared to the control
group. Only when the amount in the operator’s prompt was above the 99th percentile, the
studies found, did individuals not increase their donations.
This behavior of conditional cooperation is consistent with multiple theoretical
frameworks. First, Sugden (1984) proposed the theory of reciprocity. It rests on the idea
of “practical morality,” which sustains that individuals attempt to maximize their own
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consumption only within certain moral bounds. In this case, it means that an individual
will feel morally bound to donate to a public good if many other individuals are donating
as well.
Rabin (1993) develops another interesting theory that could shed light on this
“practical morality” of Sugden’s. Why do individuals feel morally obligated to donate
when many others are donating? This theory holds that individuals tend to respond to
generous acts, even if it is costly to them. Individuals do not always necessarily want to
be generous to everyone as Becker’s altruism would suggest. In short, individuals will
not be charitable to all; rather, they will do so according to the generosity of the other
person.
To some theorists, charity can take the form of a transaction: “you give me
something nice and I give you something nice back.” What the donor receives can vary
widely, and need not take tangible form. It can simply be what we might broadly call a
service. Its thrust could be practical, emotional, esthetic, etc. Regardless of its form and
other particulars, it will always be something the recipient enjoys and/or values. Hence,
we would expect increased donations from increased usage under this theory.

In

addition, if many others are donating money, then the individual may see this as a gift
and hence increase his own donations.

Thus, this theory is also consistent with

reciprocity.
Transactions can specifically involve an exchange of gifts, a formula analyzed by
several empirical studies. Falk (2003) compared contribution levels when gifts were and
were not included in letters requesting donations, finding that small gifts increased
contributions by 17 percent and large ones by 75 percent. This finding, Falk (2003)
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notes, may also shed light on the results found by List and Lucking-Reiley (2002). The
reason that increasing seed money significantly boosted participation rates and average
gift size, Falk observes, could be that individuals see seed money as a gift that is
reciprocated with higher donation rates. Hence, even under the gift-exchange hypothesis,
we would still expect to see a higher donation when others increase their own donations
as well, which is consistent with reciprocity.
Another possible theory, that of “social norms” (Bernheim, 1994), may also shed
light on conditional cooperation. Because a person’s status within a group is determined
by his adherence to its social norms, Bernheim theorizes that in gift-giving people have
an eye on their social status in addition to being concerned about the utility they derive
directly from consumption (the author calls this “intrinsic” utility). Hence, when status is
sufficiently important relative to “intrinsic” utility, individuals will choose to give up
some of their own consumption in order to gain social status or avoid chastisement from
the group. In fact, psychological, anthropological, and sociological research has shown
that often individuals who do not follow norms will be socially chastised.
Festinger (1954) proposed the theory of social comparisons, one that is both
consistent with reciprocity and social norms. In that theory, people look towards the
behavior of other people in order to provide information on the appropriate behavior to
follow. Once this information has been given, we can expect individuals to gravitate
towards this behavior.
Social comparisons appear to be part of a larger phenomenon observed in
marketing: the “anchor point” or “reference point” (Desmet, and Feinberg, 2003).
Consumers have been found to avail themselves of anchor points to price products on a

6

Jose Asturias
relative rather than an absolute basis, thus revealing they want an indication of what they
ought to pay for a product. Anchor points can be internal or external. Internal ones may
come, for example, from prior experience or some preconceived notion of the consumer,
while advertising is a common form of the external variant.
Desmet and Feinberg (2003) conducted a large-scale experiment as part of a
French charity’s national fundraising campaign to test the existence of these anchor
points in a fundraising setting. The researchers manipulated the suggested donation sizes
listed on solicitations. They found that different amounts (i.e., anchor points) led to very
different distribution of donations. Regardless of whether individuals interpret these
higher donation sizes as reflecting higher average donations or not, we still see that
anchor points convey social information (in this case the amount expected from the
charity), which influences donation sizes.
Vesterlund (2003) has focused on methods via which contributors identify which
charities are of a high-enough quality to support. We have 600,000 charities, with an
additional 30,000 added every year. Because of the sheer numbers involved, the author
points out, there is a major lack of information regarding most charities. For the public,
Vesterlund believes, large contributions equal broad-based support, which in turn equal a
reputation for quality. Thus an organization’s donation-based financing is taken by many
donors as a reflection of its intrinsic quality. This can explain the common practice in
fundraising campaigns of announcing large “leadership” contributions throughout the
campaign. In addition, it could explain why many fundraising campaigns begin with a
low-key effort in order to accumulate some seed money.

7

Jose Asturias
Potter (2001) conducted a laboratory experiment in order to test this hypothesis.
In the first setting, only the first donor is given information regarding the quality of the
public good. After his donation size is announced, the other subjects decide how much
to donate. Researchers found that subsequent donors tended to follow the size of the first
donor.

In another experiment, the quality of the public good was announced to

everybody. In this setting, announcing the first person’s donation size had no effect on
subsequent donation levels, showing evidence for the signaling hypothesis.
As this short review demonstrates, there are many proposed theories as to why
individuals donate to public goods. Some can exist parallel to each other, while some are
mutually exclusive. As more tests are conducted over time we will be able to identify the
most credible.
To briefly summarize the ground covered, altruism suggests that an individual
donates because he receives satisfaction from improving other people’s welfare, while
warm-glow contends that an individual receives satisfaction from donating.

Other

theories focus on pro-social behavior and are consistent with conditional cooperation—
that individuals are more likely to donate if others are donating. The exchange theory
focuses on donations being triggered by the receipt of something the donors values or
enjoys. Reciprocity suggests that if many people donate then a person will feel morally
obligated to donate as well. A possible explanation may be that individuals try to
respond to generous acts—if many other people are donating it may be seen as a gift that
much be reciprocated with a higher donation. The theory of social norms suggests that in
some circumstances individuals may give up their own consumption in order to follow a
social norm. Hence, the person may donate in order to avoid social chastisement or
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receive praise from others. Lastly, the quality hypothesis holds that large donations
signals that the charity is of high quality.

Goals
With such a bewildering abundance of theories purporting to explain charitable
behavior, any chance to test them against actual data is useful. This study will use survey
data collected from individuals who gave to public radio in order to test these theories.
Using a regression, we will assess which theory is most influential in determining
donation sizes. From these results, we will be able to see which motivations are borne
out by the findings, and their importance relative to each other.
Note should be made that Vesterlund’s “quality” hypothesis (large contributions
are a way of identifying high-quality organizations) cannot be tested in the setting of
public radio. On the other hand, it is safe to assume that

public radio donors already

have all the information they need about it. As can be seen in the chart below, those who
donate have listened to public radio for a considerable number of years. The median
number of years is 8 and the middle 50% is 5-13 years. Thus, while this theory does hold
much potential, it will not be tested in this paper.
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Data
The data used in this paper was collected during the 2003 annual fundraiser of an
east coast public radio station. This survey was enclosed in the renewal package sent to
all renewing members. Those who responded filled out the survey at approximately the
same time that they decided their donation amounts.

These surveys were returned

directly to the researchers in a separate envelope. See Appendix I for a copy of the
survey. Note that the questions on all surveys were the same; however, the order of the
questions varied to control for any differences posed by any one ordering.

These

differences did not turn out to be statistically significant.
The survey consisted of two parts. The first contained 21 questions that tried to
elicit from the individuals the motivations for donating. For each listed motivation the
individual indicated how well it matched his reason for donating by choosing a number
ranging from 1 (“Not at all”), to 5 (“Very well”). Each of these questions was tied to a
specific theory. For example, “I contribute because it feels good to contribute” attempted
to identify individuals influenced by warm-glow. “To increase the quality of the service
that other listeners get” corresponded to an altruistic motivation. These questions allow
researchers to infer motivations for donating.
The 14 questions in Part II elicit data about the individual. Questions including
listener usage, number of friends and family who also listen to public radio, estimated
average contribution of other donors, number of other stations listened to, and other
organizations the person donates to. Lastly, the donor was asked his sex, age, education,
ethnicity, zip code, and relationship status in order to control for demographic differences
across donors.
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As an incentive to return the survey, a donation of $5 was promised to the first
200 responders. There was a response rate of 14%, or 423 individuals.

All the

information collected from the survey was then linked the individual’s donation history.
Hence, the dataset contains motivations for donating and the amount donated, in addition
to demographic data.
The advantage of using a survey is that it provides data of different types to test
many different theories. Do donation sizes increase as the estimated average donation
increase as implied by conditional cooperation? Do individuals with friends that listen
tend to donate more money, as “social norms” indicates? These different theories can be
tested using this survey. In addition, it allows for the easy collection of demographic data
to control for other factors.
The main criticism of using surveys is the possibility of inaccurate data. All
pollsters know that some questions test better than others, for people’s wish to meet
presumed expectations gets in the way of their truthfulness. For example, in this sample it
was found that individuals tend to overestimate the amount they donated. So it seems
reasonable to assume some inaccurate reporting when data that could be used to “judge”
the person is being collected. On the other hand, a large segment of the questions did not
ask for this kind of data. A person has little reason to lie, for instance, if he is being asked
for the reasons he contributes.
Another potential problem is that of noisy data, which is prevalent in survey
information. The results will be that the alternative hypothesis (that a regressor has some
predictive power) will be rejected too often (see Appendix II). A possible remedy of this
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problem may be to use instrument variables, although this issue will not be addressed in
this paper.
A much larger concern is whether the sample is iid across individuals. The fact
that only 14% of those surveyed responded is not in itself problematic, for national
election polls estimate the voting patters of over 100 million people using a sample of
only a couple hundred persons. The question is whether the 14% that responded is
representative of the contributors to public radio. One possible way in which to address
this issue is to compare the demographic of those who responded to the survey and the
general donating population. This analysis would give a fairly good idea if there is a very
large bias.
That said, the limited participation in this survey places some restrictions on its
uses. The small number of people questioned in national polls is chosen by the pollsters,
while here the participants selected themselves. What distortions this fact might cause are
impossible to predict. Despite this problem, there is still much insight we can still glean
from this data.

General Description of Participant Data
Approximately 75% of individuals indicated an age between 35 and 54. Over
90% attended college and 77% graduated.

96% identified themselves as white.

Individuals reported listening an average of 3 hours per day and tuning in to an average
of 1.8 other stations. The average and median donation sizes over three years (actual
donations, not self-reported) were $109 and $82.

The average and median of the

estimated donation of other contributors were $83 and $67. In addition, the average
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individual knew 6 others who listened. However, the average individual only knew 1.5
other people who actually contributed.

Preparing for the Regression
The aim of this project is understand the motivations for individuals to donate to
public radio. Using a regression, we can assess which types of individuals tend to donate
money to public radio while controlling for many factors. We will regress average
contributions (actual contributions, not self-reported) on the questions from the survey.
One of the first issues was choosing the dependent variable of the regression. The
average 3 year contribution of the individual was chosen. By taking the average over 3
years, we ensured that the data provided a more accurate view of the person’s donation
patterns that just taking the latest year’s donation size. Implicit in this assumption is that
the person donates a certain mean plus epsilon where epsilon is a random term, with
mean zero. By taking the average over a couple of years we have a better idea of the true
average.
Next, it was necessary to choose the independent variables. The data from the
first half of the survey, the part that asked the individual to rate different reasons for
donating 1-5, could be handled in two potential ways. The first was to simply let each
question be a dependent variable. The second method was to create indexes for each
motivation. In the survey, there were some questions that were worded differently but
corresponded to the same motivation. Using a correlation table and the survey one could
identify which questions tapped into the same psychological motivation. An index could
then be created taking the average response corresponding to each motivation.
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This first method was used instead of the second. It seemed that taking the
average of these measures to create the index arbitrarily assigned weights to them. If
there were two questions that corresponded to one theory, then each one received a 50%
weight without taking into account any intrinsic or statistical reason. In addition, by
running a regression on all the responses, only the strongest overall variables would
remain in the regression, providing a more accurate measure.
The other dependent variables were the remaining questions asked in the survey,
including data about the number of friends/family members who listen, usage data, and
demographic data.
Some steps needed to be taken in order to prepare the data for the regression.
First, it was necessary to transform the data when necessary to remove outliers and to
create a normal distribution. This was done by logging the average 3 year contribution
(the dependent variable) and average amount given to other two charities (an independent
variable). These transformations can be seen in the graphs below.
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In addition the term “average amount given to other two charities” also had one
extreme outlier that posed a problem despite the log transformation. In order to avoid the
potential skewing of our results, that one data point was removed from the regression.
Furthermore, the raw data that came from the first part of the survey was
problematic; simply entering the data into the regression would have ignored that some
individuals tended to give higher marks to all motivations than others. Hence, to correct
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for this problem, the average mark for each individual was calculated and then all the
responses were subtracted from this average. In this manner, all individuals’ marks were
“standardized” to make interpretation possible.
One criticism of this method may be that it only preserves the ordering of
preferences but not necessarily the intensity of those preferences. For example, two
individuals may have the same “standardized” preferences but different levels of
intensity. Under this method they would both appear to be identical, resulting in a
problem that cannot easily be overcome. The problem comes from the fact that it is hard,
if not impossible, to distinguish between the intensity of these emotions and the arbitrary
response tendencies of each person. Hence, it is argued that the only information that can
be extracted from the data is the relative ranking of these preferences.

Regression Output
In order to arrive at the regression, the Log (three year average contribution) was
regressed on all of the answers from the survey. All factors that were insignificant at the
5% level were removed.
Another important fact to note is that the correlation among the regressors is fairly
low (see Appendix IV). In fact, the highest correlation is 0.25, which does not show
much cause for concern.
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Using the outlined strategy above yielded a regression with an adjusted R2 of
0.288. This is a fairly high R2 considering that this is cross sectional data. Hence, a
fairly significant portion of the variation in donation sizes can be explained by the
answers from the survey.
One of the most significant factors of the regression is the estimated average
donation. The correct interpretation of this coefficient is that an increase of $1 in the
estimated average donation implies a (100*0.0057)% change in the average 3 year
contribution, where 0.0057 is the term’s coefficient. Suppose that an individual donates
$100 and believes that the average donation is also $100. If his estimated average
donation increases by $1 to $101, he will on average done $0.57 more. This term is
extremely significant (p < 0.01) shows much explanatory power. This result confirms
theories of conditional cooperation in which individuals are more likely to contribute if
they think that others are contributing as well. 1
Another interesting finding is that social norms proved to be a relatively weak
influencer of donation sizes, reflected by the negative coefficients in the regression. It is
important to note that negative coefficients should not be interpreted as a motivation
having negative influence on an absolute scale. The scores for each motivation were
“standardized” and are hence a measure people’s preferences on a relative basis. The
correct interpretation of a negative coefficient is that those who are influenced by a
certain motivation tend to donate less money than those who prefer other motivations.
Hence, those individuals who ranked highly the questions relating to social norms tended
to donate less money on average than those who ranked it low. In addition, the fact that
1

Another possible explanation is that individuals use their own contributions to estimate
the contributions of others. This issue was addressed by Frey and Meier (2004), p. 1717.
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all three of these measures were negative provides more compelling evidence for this
conclusion.
This conclusion seems to be consistent with the environment in which public
radio operates. Its listeners are scattered throughout the region, making it difficult to
establish social penalties for deviating from the norm. In fact, as indicated earlier, the
average individual indicated knowing 6 people who listened but only 1.5 people who
contributed. In this case, the average individual knows more people who did not donate
than otherwise. A perception of social penalties for non-giving is doubtful.
Another possibility may be the presence of a positive element--that individuals do
not get penalized for not donating but receive praise for donating. As the average
contributor knows of only 6 other individuals who listen, this seems unlikely. It still
leaves an extremely large percentage of people who may not even know about public
radio. This fact is confirmed by the significant and negative term for the response:
“because I like others seeing my logo merchandise.” This motivation of social norms
may be stronger in “sexier” charities that are supported by movie stars and famous
musicians. Conceivably, wearing a shirt from a Bono-supported charity is likelier to
garner praise than wearing a bag with a public radio logo.
The fact that “social norms” does not seem to be a powerful influencer in public
radio donations is confirmed by the average scores to the motivations: “because my
friends contribute” and “because I like it when other people see my logo merchandise.”
As can be seen in Appendix III their average scores were 1.58 and 1.75 respectively, and
the average mark was 3.23. We can see that most donors do not consider this to be a
major factor in donating.
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The term that corresponded to altruism was also negative. Again, this means that
individuals who rated altruism highly tended to donate less money, showing that high
levels of altruism do not greatly increase donation sizes. This fact is consistent with past
literature showing this theory to be inconsistent with empirical data.
Another theory tested was whether charity could be seen as a transaction or as an
exchange of gifts. The term for thank you gifts came out to be positive, showing that
those highly motivated by the receipt of a gift tended to donate more. By the same token,
in such an exchange, two transactions are at play. That donation could, in theory, be
divided into the amount being given in exchange for use of the service, and that being
offered in exchange for the gift. The first can be thought of as traditional exchange, while
in the second the donor is paying a certain amount for the merchandise. One way to see
how much money donors are paying for the gift itself would be to remove the presents
and see how much the people then donate.
The number of stations that the individual listened to also showed a negative
coefficient, meaning that those who listened to more stations donated less money. This is
also consistent with charity as a transaction. The less sense donors had of receiving a
meaningful service from public radio, the less they gave, and visa versa. We can interpret
the number of stations an individual listens to as a proxy for the value that he places on
public radio: the more stations a person listens to, the less he values public radio. Under
the transaction hypothesis if he values public radio less he will see his consumption as a
smaller gift, hence donating less.
Both of these results are consistent with Falk’s (2003) view of charity as gift
exchange. In Falk’s study for example, it was seen that if small gifts were enclosed in
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solicitations for donations, people were be more likely to give money. In our current
case, individuals received the “gift” of being able to listen to public radio. Donors gave a
gift in return to the radio station. Lastly, the radio station gave the donor a gift for their
contribution.
The last significant term with a transactional aspect is the motivation, “To make
sure that I will get the same quality service.” Again, the negative coefficient indicates
that those who rated this highly relative to other motivations did not donate as much
money. This result appears to be logical since contributors know that their contribution
alone is not going to raise the quality of service. Hence, seeing donations as a transaction
in this sense—a person donates in the belief that they will receive higher quality in
exchange—does not hold up intuitively or in the data.
The term with the most explanatory power in the regression was the individual’s
average donations to other charities. As stated previously, it was necessary to transform
the average donation to other charities in order to remove the outliers and create a normal
distribution. Because both independent and dependent variable are log-transformed, a
1% change in average donation to two other charities results in 0.185% change in average
3 year contribution, where 0.185 is the coefficient of the term. Take the example of a
person who donates $100 to public radio and $100 on average to two other charities. For
every $1 increase in average donation to the two other charities, the person will increase
his donation to public radio by $0.185. We know that this term could either account for
wealth or some measure of warm glow.
Thus, the next step is to determine the extent to which this term proxies for
wealth. Indeed, it would be expected that individuals who contribute to more charities
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will also tend to be wealthier, for two reasons. The first is the result of the progressive
tax structure in which wealthier people pay higher taxes on their marginal income. In
addition, we would expect that those who have more resources tend to donate more
money, while individuals who can only afford basic necessities will be unable to donate
towards public goods.
There were several possible approaches in order to control for wealth. The first
occurred in the regression; demographic factors such as education are highly correlated
with earnings. However, education was not a significant factor in the regression (p-value
= 0.52). The second attempt was through the use of the person’s ZIP code in order to
determine the average income of the neighborhood--and by extension its individual
residents--as provided by the US Census Bureau. However, this factor also proved
insignificant when included in the regression. Below is a scatter plot of the transformed
average 3 year contribution and the per capita income of the neighborhood by ZIP code.
The best-fit line has a slope of 0.00000543 and the R squared is 0.000122, showing that
the average wealth of the neighborhood has no bearing on donation size. In a last attempt
to control for income, an average income was determined for each person based on their
level education and gender from US Census Bureau data. As before, there was no
significant relationship between wealth and contribution size (p-value = 0.67).
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Log(Ave 3 Yr Contribution) Vs. Per Capita Income
Log(Ave 3 Yr Contribution)

7

6

5

4

3
10000

30000

50000

70000

90000

110000

Per Capita Income

Linear Fit
Log(Ave 3 Yr Contribution) = 4.4535062 +
Income

5.43e-7 Per Capita

Summary of Fit
Rsquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum
Wgts)

0.000122
-0.00252
0.591212
4.474259
380

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Per Capita
Income

Estimate
4.4535062
5.43e-7

Std Error t Ratio
0.101136
44.03
0.000003
0.22

Prob>|t|
<.0001
0.8298

Hence, we can conclude that wealth does not play a role in determining donation
sizes.

This seems plausible given that the relatively small contributions do not

significantly change rich donors’ tax bills. Additionally, one may safely infer that public
radio’s preponderantly college-educated donors are middle class Americans whose
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income makes donations possible. Hence, it appears that this measures some propensity
to donate or the warm glow of the individual.
At the same time, altruism fails as an explanation, for under that theory donation
sizes are contingent on income. As income increases, the marginal benefit of money goes
down, while the marginal benefit of donating money remains the same. Hence, we would
expect income to be positively correlated with donation size-- which is not the case.

Caveats
One basic consideration when interpreting these results is the absence of
information on non-donors.

It is almost certain that some regressors emerged as

insignificant in determining donation size only because of the lack of non-donor
information. In Appendix III we can see the average score for each question as well as
the standard deviation. The motivation “because I listen” received an average score of
4.80, meaning that virtually everybody listed this as a motivation. However, because
there is very little variance in the data this factor did not come out to be significant. On
the other hand, if information of non-donors had been included, there would be much
more variance in the response to this question. Hence, we see that the lack of inclusion
of non-donors made certain regressors unlikely to show up as significant. Other factors
such as wealth and level of education may prove to be significant once non-donors are
included.
Another set of data is not included in our information: the arguments made during
the relevant pledge drive to appeal to donors’ wallets. Common sense, combined with our
own familiarity with pledge drives, suggests that every sort of pitch imaginable was made
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at some point during the multi-day activity. Surely the need to fill a large number of
hours of air-time with an essentially brief, unchanging message must create a sui generis
set of exigencies and even a certain amount of creative desperation. Still, the many
obstacles to collecting the data aside, it would have been interesting to correlate the
relationship between the various arguments in the station’s presentation, and the relative
weight of each, to the donors’ subsequent data. It is not inconceivable that difference in
emphasis of on the various motivations could create at least somewhat different results.
Another factor to keep in mind, as stated earlier, is the distinction between a
charity like public radio and those which do not offer a good or service for the donor’s
active “consumption.”

The motivations of donors for tsunami relief charities, for

example, will always be somewhat different than that of public radio’s contributors. In
the former, the transactional aspect would be absent, for no gift or direct service is at
issue; conversely, we would expect urges like altruism to be much stronger. The pictures
of starving children, conceivably, would activate a person’s altruism in a way that an
appeal from public radio cannot achieve.

Further Research
The gift-transactional aspect of donations would be an interesting area to explore
further.

In this “transaction” an individual receives public radio and a free gift in

exchange for a donation. As indicated earlier, it would be interesting to decompose the
value of the donation into the amount donated because of receiving public radio and the
free gift, so as to better understand the effectiveness of free gifts for fundraising.
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Also useful—on both an academic and a practical level—would to develop a
more complete model of how individuals change their donations when their expectations
of others’ donations change. While donors, as we have seen, tend to make donations in
line with the gift-giving of others, in fact their perceptions about others’ giving is
substantially underestimated. The average and median donation sizes (actual donations,
not self-reported) were $109 and $82. The average and median of the estimated donation
of other contributors were $83 and $67. Hence, the result of that research could give
guidance to public radio on increasing income by merely changing perceptions of the
average donation. In addition, if public radio could somehow raise these perceptions, it
would give researchers a natural occurring instance in which expectations are
exogenously changing.

Conclusion
Much has been written about the puzzle of why individuals contribute to public
goods, paying for something they can obtain for free. Various theories, which range from
complementary to exclusionary in their inter-relationship, have been proposed. This
paper explores donors’ motivations by using data supplied by contributors themselves,
via a public radio survey.
The answers reveal distinct patterns. Public radio’s typical donor has a longstanding relationship with the station and is an “active consumer” of its “product.” The
notion of “exchange” is a big motivator in their gift-giving. Very strong support exists
for “conditional cooperation”--individuals donate more willingly if they perceive others
are doing so as well. The “warm-glow” factor had evident appeal as well. The data
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reflected, at the same time, which motivators were less influential. The “social norm”
factor, for example, does not seem to be nearly as strong as the ones cited earlier. This is
not surprising, given that most listeners know few people who donate, making it difficult
to establish social penalties for not donating. It is also consistent with a picture that
emerges of donors giving because of their perceived personal relationship with the
station, and not because of what others may think.
There is a limit to the information that can be gleaned from one study. At the
same time, research has a way of identifying new questions even as it provides answers to
old ones. There is more to be explored, and this paper has touched on some interesting
possibilities.

Still, we have gathered important insights into the character and

motivations of public radio listeners, a fact which will be of tremendous importance both
to the institution of public radio itself and to others with a comparable function. .
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Appendix I
August 2003 Survey
In order to measure the effectiveness of this fund-raising effort, you are invited to join in
a study conducted by Professor Rachel Croson from the University of P ennsylvania. If
you could spend 5 minutes filling out this survey and send it back in the yellow selfaddressed envelope by Oct. 15, 2003, this station will receive an add itional contribution
of $5 from the survey group for each of the first 200 surveys returned. Note that your
membership renewal and this survey should be returned in two separate envelopes.
Thank you for your participation!
1 Why do you contribute to public radio? Please circle one of the five numbers for each
reason to indicate how well they describe why you contribute. Number “1” represents
“ not at all” and number “5” represents “very well”.
I contribute …
Not at all
Very well
Because I listen
Because it feels good to contribute
To make sure other listeners will get the same quality service
To make sure that I will get the same quality service
Because other people I know (e.g. friends, colleagues) contribute
So I do not feel guilty when I listen
To increase the quality of the service that other listeners get
Because I want to do my share
Because I like the thank you gifts provided
Because I want to set an example for other listeners
Because I want to set an example for my children
Because public radio is important in my life
Because I believe other funding sources are not sufficient
Because I want to help others
To prevent the station from going off the air
Because I believe that other listeners contribute
Because it is the right thing to do
Because I feel obliged to contribute
Because the staff works hard to provide the service
To increase the quality of the service I get
Because I like it when other people see my logo merchandise

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

2 In what year did you first start listening?
3 For how many hours (approximately) have you listened each day during the past year?

30

Jose Asturias
5 If you listen to stations other than this one, please list the top other three stations:
(leave the lines blank, if you do not listen to other stations either on the radio or online)

1.

2.

3.

6 What is your closest estimate of the average contribution of members?
 < $ 50
 $ 60 - $74
 $ 75 - $99
 $100
$124
 $125 – $ 179
 $ 180 - $239
 $ 240 - $ 360
 Other
7 How many people do you know who listen to this station?
Family Members  no one  1 person  2 peop le
Other
Co-workers
 no one  1 person  2 peop le
Other
Friends
 no one  1 person  2 peop le
Other

 3 peop le



 3 peop le



 3 peop le



8 How many people do you know who contribute to this station?
Family Members  no one  1 person  2 peop le  3 peop le
Other
Co-workers
 no one  1 person  2 peop le  3 peop le
Other
Friends
 no one  1 person  2 peop le  3 peop le
Other
9 What is your sex?
10 What is your age?
 18 – 24 years
years
 45 – 54 years
over

-





 Male

 Female

 25 – 29 years

 30 – 34 years

 35

 55 – 64 years

 65 – 74 years

 75 yea rs or

– 44

11 What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?
 Grade 8 or less
 Grade 9-11 years
 Graduated high
school
 1-3 years of college
 4 year college degree
 S ome graduate
credits
 Advanc ed degree (MA, MD, PHD)
12 Please indicate the category which best describes yourself
 Hispanic/Latino
 Black/African American 
Islander
 White/Caucasian
 Native American/Indian
 Mixed/Other (Please write in)
13 Please indicate your relationship status?
 Now married
 Widowed

 Divorced

A

sian/Pacific

 Separated
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Appendix II
Proof that measurement error will results in over-rejection of the alternative hypothesis:
Suppose that
Yi = B0 + B1 * xi + Ui
is the true relationship that we are trying to estimate. Now suppose that instead of xi, we
only have
xi’= xi + Vi
which represents “noisy” data. Hence, with this noisy data we will tend to estimate
Yi = A0 + A1 * xi’ + Ui
which using OLS implies that
∑ Yi xi – N * Mean (Y) * Mean (xi’)
Â1 = ---------------------------------------------∑ xi’ – N * Mean (xi’)^2
which converges in probability to
B1 * σx^2
----------------- < B1
σx^2 + σx’^2
Hence, with noisy data, which is the case for surveys, we will tend to consider more
regressors insignificant than we should.
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Appendix III
Question
Because I want to help others
increase other's quality
Listeners Same Quality
Because I want to set an example to others
To make sure that I will get the same quality service
To prevent the station from going off the air
Because the staff works hard to provide the service
Because it is important in my life
Because I like the thank you gifts
Because my friends contribute
Because I believe that other listeners contribute
Because I like it when other people see my logo merchandise

Because I want to do my share
Because I feel obliged to contribute
Funding not sufficient
Because it is the right thing to do
So I do not feel guilty when I listen
To increase the quality of the service I get
Because I listen
Because it feels good to contribute
Average

Question
Because I want to help others
increase other's quality
Listeners Same Quality
Because I want to set an example to others
To make sure that I will get the same quality service
To prevent the station from going off the air
Because the staff works hard to provide the service
Because it is important in my life
Because I like the thank you gifts
Because my friends contribute
Because I believe that other listeners contribute
Because I like it when other people see my logo merchandise

Because I want to do my share
Because I feel obliged to contribute
Funding not sufficient
Because it is the right thing to do
So I do not feel guilty when I listen
To increase the quality of the service I get
Because I listen
Because it feels good to contribute
Average

Average St. Dev.
2.93
1.25
2.69
1.22
2.82
1.28
2.83
1.35
3.78
1.15
4.27
1.00
3.82
1.11
4.19
0.91
2.65
1.20
1.58
0.91
2.54
1.26
1.75
1.08
4.25
0.83
2.98
1.26
3.47
1.13
3.98
1.04
2.55
1.28
3.03
1.26
4.80
0.55
3.71
1.08
3.23

1.11

Average St. Dev.
-0.31
0.96
-0.55
0.92
-0.42
0.99
-0.39
1.07
0.54
0.92
1.01
0.92
0.58
0.86
0.94
0.84
-0.59
1.08
-1.64
0.84
-0.69
1.01
-1.47
0.96
1.01
0.76
-0.24
1.14
0.23
1.05
0.73
0.90
-0.67
1.16
-0.19
1.03
1.53
0.74
0.46
0.88
-0.01

0.95
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Appendix IV
Question6: Est_ Average
Question6: Est_ Average

Log(Average other two)

Gender

Other_Stations

Thank you Gifts

Listeners Same Quality

I same Quality

Friends

Like LOGO

-0.12

Gender

-0.09

1.00
-0.23

1.00

Other_Stations

0.05

0.06

-0.19

1.00

Thank you Gifts

0.08

-0.02

-0.01

-0.07

Listeners Same Quality

0.04

-0.02

-0.06

-0.01

-0.08

-0.06

0.01

-0.06

0.02

-0.12

0.15

1.00

0.05

0.05

-0.17

-0.03

0.19

-0.06

-0.25

0.01

0.02

-0.06

0.03

0.23

-0.10

-0.17

0.22

1.00

-0.01

0.09

-0.13

0.13

-0.13

-0.26

-0.21

-0.11

-0.05

I same Quality
Friends
Like LOGO
obliged

obliged

1.00

Log(Average other two)

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
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